Reaffirming Commitment to Non-Proliferation
Chair,
I wish to address the assembly on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States to categorically dismiss the allegations regarding Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement. Australia’s initiative to develop this capability aligns fully with both the letter and the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the global safeguards framework.
The remarks made earlier seem intended to instil doubt regarding the legitimacy of our actions. We have encountered unfounded assertions concerning our undertakings that aim to create a false narrative of non-compliance where none exists. It is evident that China has consistently used this agenda item to advance a political narrative that is not constructive.
The persistent inclusion of this topic in discussions detracts from the rights of all Member States to engage confidentially and directly with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards and verification measures. Therefore, it is imperative that we address this matter in every Board session to expose such interference for what it truly is.
Challenging Politically Motivated Allegations
We remain sceptical about the value of the agenda item presented by China. Its political motivations are clear, and it has never garnered consensus. This issue not only wastes time and resources but also undermines the Director General’s independent technical mandate concerning Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion programme, which serves no one’s interests.
Chair,
We have repeatedly heard claims that disregard the information provided by the AUKUS partners in good faith, contradicting the statements made by the Director General. The facts speak for themselves.
The AUKUS partners are fully adhering to their international obligations, including those stipulated by the NPT, the Treaty of Rarotonga and its Protocols, as well as Australia’s IAEA safeguards agreements.
The IAEA Statute empowers the Agency to negotiate safeguards and verification arrangements directly and confidentially with Member States. Any political interference, as suggested, would compromise the Agency’s independence and technical authority, which should be a concern for all involved.
Clarifying the Legal Framework for Naval Nuclear Propulsion
The drafters of the NPT anticipated naval nuclear propulsion. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153), which forms the basis for Australia’s agreement, specifically permits States Parties to utilise nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion within the established safeguards framework.
The NPT allows for the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level, provided the transfer is not intended for nuclear weapons and is conducted in accordance with relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s programme will be subjected to a robust set of safeguards and verification measures, consistent with its long-standing commitment to non-proliferation. The arrangement under Article 14 will enable the IAEA to continue fulfilling its technical objectives.
Once Australia and the Secretariat reach an agreement on the Article 14 arrangement, it will be presented to the Board for appropriate action. Claims suggesting that the Board will be circumvented are categorically unfounded.
Commitment to Transparency and Engagement
In stark contrast to the misleading assertions made, the AUKUS partners have been open in their communications with this Board regarding our support for Australia’s preparations to operate conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
As previously indicated, the visits of UK and US submarines to Australia, including through the Submarine Rotational Force-West from 2027, are pivotal in preparing Australia for the safe and secure operation and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines. Gaining direct experience alongside AUKUS partners represents the most effective means of building this capability. These visits are in full compliance with the international obligations of AUKUS partners. We will provide further updates to the Board regarding recent developments under Any Other Business.
Chair,
Since the inception of AUKUS in 2021, the partners have provided comprehensive updates at every regular Board meeting, all of which are accessible online. We encourage China and other interested parties to review these updates and engage directly with AUKUS partners for any further inquiries, rather than occupying the Board’s valuable time with issues that have already been addressed.
We remain committed to ongoing and transparent dialogue regarding AUKUS, will continue to update the Board under “Any Other Business”, and welcome additional reports from the Director General as he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.