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In March 2026, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, unveiled the Americas Shield, a regional initiative presented as a partnership aimed at combating drug trafficking and transnational organised crime. At its inception, twelve Latin American countries joined this initiative. The presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago were all present in a prominent photograph featuring Trump, seated at a table surrounded by these leaders standing behind him. Chile, however, was merely an observer at that time, with formal adherence to the Americas Shield materialising in September. Currently, the membership has expanded to seventeen countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia, under the leadership of Abelardo de la Espriella, and Peru, led by Keiko Fujimori after winning their respective presidential elections, being the latest additions to this coalition. Guatemala, Jamaica, and Belize have also joined, while the Bahamas remains an observer. All the presidents aligning with this US-driven initiative share ideological similarities with American policies.
Strategic Interests Behind the Initiative
Alberto Acosta, an Ecuadorian economist and former president of Ecuador’s Constituent Assembly, argues that this initiative is not a broad agreement allowing all countries to intervene; rather, it originates from Washington and is deeply entwined with US strategic interests. He describes it as a vertical initiative carrying political, economic, and military implications. Acosta suggests that the US’s focus on combating drug trafficking and organised crime serves as a pretext to establish control over essential resources, including critical minerals such as lithium and copper.
Fernando Estenssoro, an economist from Chile and director of the PhD program in American Studies at the University of Santiago, offers a harsher critique, labelling the initiative as detrimental to regional sovereignty and situated within the ongoing geopolitical struggle between the United States and China. He asserts that Trump’s interest lies in natural resources, specifically oil, copper, and rare earth minerals. Estenssoro explains that as the US faces a decline in hegemony, it views the resources of South America as vital that should not fall into the hands of its ‘enemy’—China.
Natural Resources as a Point of Interest
Estenssoro highlights that Latin America boasts over 20 million square kilometres rich in various natural resources, including rare earth elements and strategic minerals crucial for digitalisation and new technologies. He points out that South America contains the largest oil reserves globally, particularly in Venezuela. The region also possesses significant lithium reserves concentrated in the “Lithium Triangle” formed by Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, which is essential for energy storage in batteries powering vehicles and electronic devices.
Moreover, South America is rich in copper, a critical material for the construction industry due to its use in electrical wiring, plumbing, and thermal systems, as well as in the automotive sector for engines and electronic components. Chile stands as the world’s leading copper producer, with Peru ranking third, and both countries primarily export to China. However, other nations like Argentina and Colombia, which have not traditionally been significant players in the copper industry, are now striving to enter the global market, as indicated by recent research.
Formal Agreements and Economic Control
The joint Declaration on Hemispheric Sovereignty, published by the US Department of State on September 22, 2026, outlines the three pillars of the Americas Shield: economic cooperation, security, and multilateral coordination. Specifically, the economic component aims to enhance cooperation by exploring investment control mechanisms, safeguarding supply chains of critical minerals through diversified and reliable sourcing, and promoting non-discriminatory regulations regarding trusted suppliers for digital infrastructure.
Acosta critiques this declaration, suggesting it merely serves to ensure control over natural resources. He notes the bilateral investment treaties the US is forging with countries involved in the Americas Shield, such as the recent agreement with Ecuador to secure access to strategic resources. In February 2026, Ecuador and the US signed a framework agreement focused on the supply and processing of strategic minerals, which has been met with skepticism from the Ecuadorian legislature.
Militarisation Concerns
Acosta contends that the US is leveraging the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime as a means to assert control over these nations. He cites a recent law passed in Ecuador that ostensibly permits the militarisation of regions rich in minerals, aiming to suppress community resistance by labelling them as narco-terrorists if necessary. During the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, Trump declared that the US would not tolerate threats to ‘America’ gaining ground in the Western Hemisphere, asserting the use of military power if deemed necessary to protect vital national interests.
Trump’s address included a meeting with leaders from the countries participating in the Americas Shield, where he emphasised the natural wealth of these nations and urged them to prevent hostile external powers from seizing control of these resources.
Implications for Regional Sovereignty
Ricardo Soberón, former executive director of Peru’s National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs, articulates the implications of the Americas Shield for Peru and the broader region. He argues that the political costs of joining this agreement are substantial, as it encompasses investments and the exploitation of strategic minerals, positioning countries against China and influencing the port of Chancay. Soberón expresses concern that many nations in the region have capitulated to this agreement, which, although non-binding, paves the way for a series of subsequent agreements and memoranda of understanding.
He further critiques the strategic mineral agreements forged with various countries, citing the example of Venezuela, where the US has effectively seized control of the oil sector through military action. According to Soberón, the Americas Shield has established a presence in the region without concrete financial commitments, contrasting it with previous initiatives that were backed by assured funding.
Technological Aspirations and Resource Control
Acosta concludes that the US is keen to secure the technological resources necessary for artificial intelligence, which requires substantial mineral inputs. He notes that minerals are not solely vital for energy transition but are also crucial for the arms industry and artificial intelligence. The minerals needed for weapons production include graphite, cobalt, aluminium, lithium, manganese, and rare earth elements, while those for artificial intelligence comprise copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earths.
He asserts that the US aims to maintain a competitive edge over China in this technological race, deeming access to strategic minerals as essential. Both Estenssoro and Soberón acknowledge the escalating competition for resources, predicting severe shortages in the coming years. Estenssoro warns that the latest battlegrounds are microchips, as the automotive industry, once dominated by the US and Europe, faces increasing competition from Chinese manufacturers.
In this context, the Americas Shield appears to be an endeavour to establish an economic protectorate over these nations, leading to what some experts describe as a policy of recolonisation, reinforcing the notion that the geopolitical landscape of the region is profoundly influenced by the interplay of global powers.
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